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Microaccountability and biopolitics: 
Microfinance in a Sri Lankan village 
ABSTRACT 
Based on a micro-level study of microfinance, this paper explores how basic accounting 
technologies and interpersonal accountability are used to make lending to poor village women 
profitable and low risk. We argue that “microaccountability,” our term for the structuring and 
formalization of convivial relationships into a capillary system of accountability, must be 
recognized as a central tool of social governance under neoliberalism. Our field research in Sri 
Lanka allows us to analyse how microaccountability is employed by for-profit banks to create 
from poor villagers a legion of bankable individual entrepreneurs, trained to invigilate each 
other’s savings and credit behaviours. Using the theoretical lens of biopolitics, we show how 
microaccountability enables the extension of the finance industry into untapped sectors of the 
global population. 
Key words: microaccountability, biopolitics, microfinance, neoliberalism, Sri Lanka 
1. INTRODUCTION 
<< Insert Figure 1 >> 
The women in the photograph on the left of Figure 1 are the recipients of microloans 
in Parakatawella, in the Kandy district of Sri Lanka. They are the “poor enterprising 
clients” – to use the phrase we heard frequently in our fieldwork – of Isuru Sanwardana 
Society, a regional microfinance development bank. They are organized as a “self-help 
group,” the grassroots operational unit of the bank, and are attending a regular group 
meeting to discuss their individual and collective financial situations. Discussions centre 
on the cashbook shown in the other picture, maintained by the group’s treasurer, and the 
accounting records that individual members of the group maintain for themselves. These 
women had been, and remain, in convivial kinship networks as relatives, close friends 
and neighbours, and these relationships are the basis of their self-help group. In their 
traditional relationships, they shared cultural rituals for working and saving together. 
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Now, gathered into formal groups and monitored through their prescribed accounting 
records, they are being disciplined to construct themselves as microentrepreneurs. With 
this new economic identity, they contribute to the global financial system, while paying 
much higher interest rates than other borrowers. 
Drawing on detailed field data gathered over four years, this paper examines how 
microfinance, as a system of accounting and accountability, reconfigures the convivial 
relations of such women into financial relations. We argue that microfinance rests on the 
reproduction of women’s lives into a system of what we are calling microaccountability, 
where accountability for saving and borrowing has been diffused into the small daily 
interactions of one individual woman with another, transforming such interactions into 
a system of self-surveillance and self-monitoring that harnesses them to global capital. 
The question of how accounting and accountability are implicated in the 
construction of the individual has been a prominent theme in accounting literature, 
particularly in research drawing on Foucault’s analysis of governmentality (1979, 1984a, 
1984b, 1991, 2003a, 2003b). Seminal works in this literature explored the notion of 
accounting as a disciplinary technology (Hopper & Macintosh, 1993; Hoskin & Macve, 
1986; Knights & Collinson, 1987; Miller & O'Leary, 1987). This has resulted in a focus 
within Foucauldian accounting literature on governmental and corporate settings 
congruent with disciplinary enclosures, such as factories, boarding schools, and military 
academies. Much less attention has been paid to accounting beyond such enclosures 
(Martinez, 2011). Following Martinez (2011), this article examines the roles of 
accounting in post-disciplinary “society of control” (Deleuze, 1992). That is, we explore 
how accounting technologies are being used as both disciplinary and biopolitical tools in 
contemporary neoliberalism, to govern populations in ways that extend economic 
production beyond the factory into the lives of individuals and the global economy into 
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every region of the planet. We thus connect existing accounting research on the 
disciplinary formation of the individual to the biopolitical transformations of populations 
occurring today under neoliberal reforms. 
Our analysis highlights three interrelated processes by which local Sri Lankan 
villages are integrated into the global financial system as sites of microfinance. The first 
process uses selected individual villagers to animate microfinance projects at the local 
level, encouraging entrepreneurial activity and financial risk-taking by local women. The 
second corporatizes the traditional village, transforming it into a productive hierarchical 
structure for the management of savings and credit, with the women’s self-help groups 
at the base. The third uses these structures to enforce compulsory savings and invigilate 
loans through the assembly of a biopolitical account of the women’s activities, which is 
used for mutual monitoring and for reporting to the bank. Together, these three 
processes ensure that individual women conform to the required norms of depositing, 
financial risk-taking, borrowing and repaying, in order to become “bankable” people, 
producing a new way of village life in a credit-driven market economy. 
Our paper builds on prior studies of accountability (Kosmala & McKernan, 2011; 
Kosmala MacLullich, 2003; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991). We contribute to this 
literature by showing how, in post-disciplinary society, accounting technologies are used 
to permeate everyday life (Walker, 2008, p. 454; 2016, p. 47) and formalize existing 
interpersonal accountability relationships. Our study parallels in some important 
respects the work of O’Leary (2017), whose study of rural development programs in 
India sheds light on the “downward” accountability of NGOs to their beneficiaries. 
However, where the NGOs examined by O’Leary adopted a rights-based approach to their 
work, and used small groups to promote self-determination amongst their beneficiaries, 
the microfinance institutions in our study use small groups to improve the savings rates 
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and loan repayment rates of individual borrowers. They seek to do this by promoting the 
accountability of group members to each other for their financial behaviour. We argue 
that the resulting mechanism of microaccountability is fundamental to the production of 
the neoliberal self at the margins of the global economy, and to the monetization of 
traditional rural life. 
To help us understand these processes in the context of a neoliberal society that has 
greatly changed since Foucault produced his analysis of biopolitics in the late 1970s, we 
draw, in Section 2, on social theorists who have extended his work. These include Deleuze 
(1992), who sees post-disciplinary society as a society of control, and Hardt and Negri 
(2000), who see the integrated global economy of today as a postmodern “Empire.” In 
Section 3, we describe the methodologies of our field research. In Section 4, we analyse 
our data to identify the three interrelated processes mentioned above, by which village 
life is transformed economically and politically. In Section 5, we discuss the implications 
of our study for accounting research. Section 6 concludes the paper by connecting our 
insights on microfinance and microaccountability to a broader interpretation of 
contemporary neoliberalism. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMING 
As mentioned above, we use the term microaccountability to denote what we 
observed in our field research, that accountability for repayment of microfinance loans is 
not a binary relationship between a borrower and lender, but has been diffused into the 
network of small daily interactions of women. This diffusion happens through a 
deliberate process of arranging and mobilizing the interpersonal accountability 
relationships that exist between family members and neighbours, to ensure that 
borrowers maintain correct financial discipline. To facilitate our examination of the 
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relationship between microaccountability and the self in global neoliberalism, we bring 
together three academic literatures. The first is about accountability, which establishes a 
base from which we can theorize microaccountability. The second is about biopolitics, 
which helps us understand how society is governed through technologies for the 
production of life. The third is about postmodern modes of production in the global 
economy, which provides us with specific analytical tools for understanding recent 
developments in microfinance. We pull these three streams of literature together in a 
fourth subsection to define microaccountability as a technology of global production. 
2.1. Accountability 
Opening the debate on local and moral circumstances of accountability, Roberts 
(1990, 1991; see also Roberts & Scapens, 1985) contrasted hierarchical and social forms 
of accountability within the organization. Roberts argued that hierarchical forms of 
accountability construct the self in a way that emphasizes one’s solitary and isolated 
character (Roberts, 1990, p. 356). However, he also recognized the socializing effect of 
accountability on the self, and the tensions and interdependencies between the formal 
and informal, and between individualising and socializing forms of accountability. Within 
such tensions, possibilities of accountability emerge for organizational members to 
understand the interdependence of their actions. 
Messner (2009) extends the work of Roberts by incorporating insights from other 
accountability theorists. Drawing on Shearer (2002), Messner asserts that accountability 
begins with the other, rather than the self, inasmuch as our ontological self-
understanding is formed in regard to our obligations to others. He notes the important 
distinction Roberts (1991) makes between hierarchical and socializing responsibility, 
emphasizing the value of informal face-to-face accountability to others, absent any 
prescribed rules and formats for providing accounts, and absent as well the large 
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differences in power and the “rush to a specific result” (Messner, 2009, p. 922) that 
characterize formal accounting. Drawing on McKernan and Kosmala MacLullich (2004), 
Messner notes the importance of non-rational aspects of communication, including 
emotion and affection, in the act of rendering an informal account to others. 
Pulling these sources together, Messner (2009, p. 923) argues for the importance of 
a pragmatic rather than an idealistic approach to accountability. Specifically, he argues 
that an overemphasis on the demands of the other for an account neglects the possibility 
that there may be ethically appropriate limits to providing an account. To explore these 
limits, he draws on Butler (2005). Based on Butler’s insights into giving accounts to 
others, Messner argues that the rendering of an account is always limited by our ability 
to know ourselves and to communicate that knowledge. Thus, while we need some kind 
of agreement about what constitutes an account, that very agreement can distance us 
from the account; the discursive structure of an acceptable form of account creates a gap 
between what we know and what we can say. 
Messner argues that the ethical gap arising between the demand for accountability 
and the ability to provide an account can be reduced by limiting the number of others to 
whom a party is held to account, as is done in financial accounting standards; by aligning 
the interests of the responsible party and those who demand and account; and by 
eliminating the extent of required accounts by having both parties participate in decision 
making. Our study examines an attempt to overcome the limits of accountability 
differently, by embedding the provision of accounts within the lives of local women, 
organized into microborrowing groups that are themselves embedded within a new 
hierarchical village system that connects the women to the global financial system. 
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2.2. Biopolitics and neoliberalism 
We see this reorganization of village women into an efficient yet “natural” financial 
machine as the extension of neoliberalism to the poor. Foucault (2008, pp. 216-217), in 
his much cited 1979 lectures, argued that neoliberalism represents an extension of 
economic rationalism into areas of life that have not previously been considered in 
economic terms (p. 219). The fundamental epistemological break in neoliberalism 
compared to prior economic thinking is its reconceptualization of labour, whereby the 
labourer who had been considered an object or cost is now considered a subject who 
makes rational choices (p. 223). The individual worker, regarded as an enterprise, as 
homo œconomicus, an entrepreneur of himself, is posited as the source of his own 
earnings (pp. 225-226). 
Munro (2012) provides a useful summary of Foucault’s distinction between 
disciplinary and neoliberal governance (see Table 1). The operating principle of 
neoliberalism is the circulation of capital. Neoliberal governance consists of a collection 
of mechanisms and rationalities for organizing populations to enable capital to circulate. 
Subjectivity shifts from self-discipline to entrepreneurialism. The labourer becomes 
oriented towards competition as an individual in the market. 
<< Insert Table 1 >> 
This reconceptualization of labour under neoliberalism is what allows the 
extension of market thinking into formerly non-market policy areas (Foucault, 2008, p. 
240), such as poverty reduction. This way of thinking ignores structural causes of poverty 
and recasts the problem in individual terms. The paradox we encounter in our fieldwork 
is that this hyper-individualized logical model, founded ostensibly on the principle of 
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competition, only works in practice if a way can be found to take advantage of existing 
convivial social relationships. 
However, it is not enough to use these relationships as they are found. To get the 
rural labourer to adopt entrepreneurial thinking and behaviours, it is also necessary to 
reorganize the social relationships in which she is embedded, to make them prescriptive, 
directive and purposeful. This requires that the technologies deployed into this field, 
including the arrangements for accountability, must produce life, not merely measure it 
or reflect it. This is, for Foucault, one of the features of biopolitics that distinguishes it 
from the disciplinary society: the disciplinary society is about the production of self-
disciplined individuals whereas biopolitics is about the production of life. Foucault 
described this in terms of centripetal and centrifugal forces. Discipline concentrates and 
encloses, while the biopolitical apparatuses of security that support neoliberal 
governance are expansionary, pushing market logic to the ends of the earth (Foucault, 
2007). In neoliberal biopolitics, the boundaries of the workplace and other institutions 
are transcended, and the production of the entrepreneurial individual is integrated into 
all aspects of life. 
2.3. Postmodern modes of production 
Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that this extension of economic thinking into 
individual lives and into all areas of society has reached a point where it also transcends 
political and conceptual boundaries, permeating and producing all areas of life, such that 
“the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another” 
(p. xiii). They argue that the global order has bypassed the national state to become 
“Empire,” an unbounded society founded on the biopolitical production of social reality. 
Drawing on Foucault, they suggest that we have passed from a disciplinary society to a 
global version of what Deleuze (1992) called a “society of control” (see also Martinez, 
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2011). Disciplinary society works “through a diffuse network of dispositifs or apparatuses 
that produce and regulate customs, habits, and productive practices” (Hardt & Negri, 
2000, p. 23). In contrast, the society of control operates more immanently, through the 
“brains and bodies of the citizens” (p. 23). Governance thus moves from networks of 
apparatuses and institutions to flexible networks of people. 
This means that power in the society of control is about the production of life itself. 
It is power enacted through the individual in relation to others, a radical intensification 
of discipline (p. 24). The society of control operates through capillary action, diffusing 
power down to the level of the individual. This individualizes and neutralizes resistance 
and absorbs it into culture, a central moment of control that achieves “maximum plurality 
and uncontainable singularization” (p. 25). Every individual is an exception. This is 
consistent with the atomization of labour and the reframing of the individual worker as 
an entrepreneur of him or herself, a neoliberal commonplace today that brings Foucault’s 
insights of 1979 to full fruition. 
Hardt and Negri (p. 27) claim that Foucault, despite his identification and analysis 
of biopower, operated through an institutionalist framework and thus failed to grasp the 
dynamics of production in biopower. They argue that in the new mode of production, 
labour is immersed in the social. A new theory of subjectivity is needed, they say, that 
“operates primarily through knowledge, communication and language” (p. 29). Hardt and 
Negri set out to develop such a theory by focusing on three distinct aspects of immaterial 
labour: communicative labour through information networks, interactive labour of 
symbolic analysis and problem solving, and the production and manipulation of affects 
in the body. In our case study, we emphasize the first of these aspects, the enlisting of 
village women in an information network through the formation of small self-help 
groups. 
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Hardt and Negri (pp. 43-44) suggest that the present global order, Empire, avoids 
some of the cruelty of modern power while increasing the potential for liberation. 
However, they dismiss the opposition between the global and the local frequently 
adopted by critical scholars. They argue that the global order both produces and feeds off 
difference. That is, Empire grows not through the production of homogeneity but through 
the production of local differences. This is important for our understanding of the role of 
local communities in microfinance. The individual and the local are not barriers to profit, 
they drive profit. This is postmodern logic operating in the field of financial capital. 
Corporations harness difference not by excluding the Other but by incorporating the 
Other. The poor have been the one constant in history, the always excluded Other, argue 
Hardt and Negri. Yet the poor are distinguished by their “indispensable presence” in the 
production of wealth (p. 157). This is why they are central to the global order, not simply 
marginalized. They have a productive function. Though excluded from wealth, they are 
integral to its production. 
2.4. Microaccountability and global capital 
The arguments of Hardt and Negri can seem at times overstated. Nonetheless, they 
do provide us with a provocative starting point for addressing our research questions on 
the production of the accountable self in a post-disciplinary society. We contend that, just 
as the processes of global economic production now diffuse throughout society down to 
the level of the individual in everyday life, so the accountability that integrates this 
system diffuses down to the level of the individual in everyday life. Our observations at 
the local level in Sri Lankan microfinance show that existing interpersonal accountability 
relationships are deliberately arranged and mobilized to create an effective apparatus of 
microaccountability. We will argue, in the analysis and discussion below, that the 
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microaccountability of one individual to others is crucial to the postmodern production 
of wealth by the poor, by which we mean the enlisting of the poor in the service of capital. 
Our analysis will also show that microaccountability simultaneously embeds both 
disciplinary and biopolitical apparatuses of governance. Though operating outside 
panoptical disciplinary enclosures, it effectively creates an system in which individual 
conduct is put under perpetual surveillance via social networks. At the same time, 
microaccountability performs accounting to connect the individual to larger schemas of 
financial engineering, under social rubrics such as poverty alleviation and rural 
development. This serves to legitimize the monetization of the poor. 
The notion of microaccountability helps us to understand how microfinance 
functions as a tool for the administration of today’s global society. As Hardt and Negri 
(pp. 339-343) explain, the global system for the production of life depends on creating 
and managing new mechanisms for segmenting the population, in order to exploit 
difference and control the resulting separate social forces. In the past, in what Foucault 
called a disciplinary society, this was a rational problem amenable to engineering 
solutions. However, in the network mode of administration that operates today, 
managing difference is a fractal problem, that is, one that requires increasingly more local 
solutions. Indeed, the consent of the governed is achieved through local effectiveness, not 
through universal principles. This is why it is important to understand microfinance not 
as a tool for economic development but as a tool for governance, and to recognize how it 
operates through microaccountability, which depends intimately on the local. Our case 
study of Sri Lankan microfinance has therefore been organized and conducted to explore 
local phenomena. 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The primary source of data for this paper is our fieldwork in three villages in Sri 
Lanka, where a great variety of development projects have been attempted, each with 
implications for the forms and practices of accounting, accountability and governance 
(Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008; Alawattage, Wickramasinghe, & Tennakoon, 
2014). The villages we studied are amongst many recently subjected to development 
through microfinance. They were selected for our study because of the deep network of 
local contacts two of the authors have there. 
As summarised in Table 2, we conducted 71 hours of initial fieldwork, including 
interviews with 49 respondents. This fieldwork took place between February and August 
in 2013, in July 2014, and in December 2014. As the table indicates, we approached a 
variety of respondents, including central bank officers, regional bank officers, 
microfinance animators, women microborrowers and their family members, and a local 
academic. We also reflected on secondary sources available in the public domain, starting 
in January 2013, and reviewed a comprehensive set of documents collected from the 
microfinance actors and their offices, including each type of form and report used by the 
microfinance institutions at the local and regional levels. 
<< Insert Table 2 >> 
This first phase of our fieldwork also included 15 direct observations at the local 
level, comprising nine small group meetings and six microbusiness visits, conducted in 
August 2013, July 2014, and December 2014. While our visits covered three villages, in 
our analysis we consistently highlight one of the three villages, Parakatawella, from 
which our most detailed data was collected, in order to make our study as concrete as 
possible. Our observation of a specially arranged group meeting in Parakatawella, held at 
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the house of a borrowing-group member, focused on how the cashbook was used for their 
microfinance activities. The researcher attending this meeting took photographs of 
account books and related documents, and talked to several attendees individually after 
the meeting. Details from other regular group meetings were confirmed at this meeting. 
Following these conversations, the same researcher visited microbusinesses run by 
members, also summarised in Table 2. Later, follow-up Skype calls with the officers and 
telephone calls with the women were used to clarify details. Data was electronically (and 
manually in some instances) recorded and subsequently transcribed. 
After an initial round of reviews at this journal, we decided to return to 
Parakatawella for a second phase of fieldwork, in order to conduct additional interviews 
with the women in one of the microborrowing groups we had visited earlier. This enabled 
us to focus the paper more closely on the lives and experiences of these women, and to 
fill in various gaps in our initial analysis identified by the reviewers. The additional 
interviews were conducted in 2016 and 2017. 
The above data collection efforts conformed to our research methodology, which 
drew upon a post-positivistic, reflexive epistemology (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009; Chua, 
1986; Tomkins & Groves, 1983). We wanted to allow the subjective constructions of 
actors’ views to be seen, and to allow inductive inferences of meanings to be made from 
the participants’ own subjective and qualitative interpretations of their experience, in the 
light of our theoretical framework. 
4. BIOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL MICROFINANCE IN SRI LANKA 
4.1. Background: Traditional Village Financial Practices 
Prior to the advent of microfinance, financial practices in rural Sri Lanka were 
confined to monetary flows within the village itself, with no recourse to the formal 
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banking sector. A prominent traditional social schema of saving, lending and borrowing, 
the ciettu system, facilitated the pooling of savings amongst villagers. Groups of a dozen 
people were the traditional size that allowed each ciettu to run for a calendar year. Each 
member was required to contribute a specific but equal monthly amount (say Rs 2000) 
to a monthly cash pot. This pot would be available to an individual participant to use for 
certain socially accepted needs, such as paying for a family wedding or buying 
schoolbooks for one’s children. The rotation for taking the monthly cash pot would be 
decided according to two different ciettu systems: a “draw cieittu” decided by a random 
draw, which was nevertheless subject to modification due to special circumstances like 
an upcoming wedding, and an “auction ciettu” where the monthly pot would be put up 
for bid. The latter was more popular among businessmen than women. The ciettu system 
for pooling and exchanging money paralleled the traditional system for pooling and 
exchanging women’s labour. Traditionally, women would gather together to work: 
Our parents were all poor but they worked together to earn together. Mostly, 
they worked in paddy fields as a collective gang or “aththan.” For example, 
during [the period of planting], my mother used to take several jobs [contracts 
to plant for owners of paddy fields]…. For doing these jobs, she has a gang of 
10 to 15 women in the village. They are all neighbours and relatives. All these 
women also did the same thing by using the same women for each other’s job 
contracts with other landlords. That means every individual woman works for 
10 to 15 women’s work [gangs] during a period of three months or so. When 
I was young, I also joined them to work. It was enjoyable. Everybody worked 
together, sang together, and ate together. Everybody must work free for each 
other. And, the women who has the contract with the landlord gets money for 
the job. (Interviewee 11, Microfinance Borrower)  
The women would take turns working for each other on a project that paid one 
woman, knowing that the gift of labour would eventually be returned. The women would 
also work in teams to make clothing for sharing amongst the participants. These are the 
convivial work patterns disrupted by microfinance, which draws on vestiges of the 
comradery and teamwork that characterized traditional work. 
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In addition to the ciettu savings tradition, there was also a traditional system of 
lending in place. Local wealthy businessmen and women would offer loans to villagers in 
need of emergency cash, often at a very high interest rate (similar to the rates now 
charged by microfinance lenders).1 Because of the high interest rate and the coercive 
means employed to recover such loans, these were “last resort” loans for the villagers. 
Our fieldwork revealed that these traditional systems are still in existence, but are 
being partially supplanted by microfinance programs. We learned that the ciettu remains 
more popular than the coercive local lending system, at least in Parakatawella and the 
other two villages we visited. Other informal loan arrangements also exist amongst family 
members and friends, but the ciettu is the traditional system closest in form to the 
microfinance arrangements we observed. 
4.2. Microfinance and the construction of the bankable person 
The global neoliberal agenda arrived in Sri Lanka in mid 1970s when President J. R. 
Jayawardena declared an “open economic policy” (Chowdary, 2005). The liberal welfare 
state was to be replaced by a market system where open global economic competition 
was presumed to be the appropriate strategy for rapid development. Programmes of 
‘structural transformation’ directed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and other global financial institutions were embraced. The government privatized public 
enterprises on a large scale and liberalized trade and finance. By the 1980s, this 
neoliberal movement had penetrated the urban economy, but not the rural masses. 
However, as a “decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively 
incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers” (Hardt & Negri, 
                                                      
1 Microfinance promoters in Sri Lankan banks consistently justified the high interest rates applied to microfinance 
loans by benchmarking against the rates of these traditional village lenders, rather than against the lower rates the 
bank applied to its larger business loans. 
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2000, p. xii), post-industrial neoliberalism eventually expanded into the uncharted 
decision-making milieus of rural poverty. The vehicle for this was microfinance (Ramani, 
2005). 
Unlike countries where microfinance has arguably emerged as a grassroots practice 
(Dixon, Ritchie, & Siwale, 2006), in Sri Lanka microfinance was a development project 
promoted by international development agencies. In interviews with central and regional 
bank officials, we learned that initial funding came mainly from the World Bank, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the Japan International 
Corporation Agency (JICA) as project loans to the Sri Lankan government. Funding was 
then delivered to the “qualifying poor” through a market driven institutional 
arrangement, which a Central Bank official explained as follows: 
Now if you take the JICA project, JICA provided a loan to the Sri Lankan 
Government, … to the government Treasury, not to the Central Bank. … The 
rate JICA charged was 0.67% per annum. Then the Treasury hand that to the 
Central Bank as a loan charging 4%, … because it is the government who bear 
the exchange rate risk and that 4% is mainly to offset that risk. Then the 
Central Bank, as the banker to the banks, provided refinancing loans to 
commercial banks and regional rural development banks. We charged them 
4.5%; 0.5% is to cover our administrative costs. In that project, the 
commercial banks and development banks have charged around 12% interest 
per annum from the people.… This 12% per annum is not bad at all compared 
to the rate that the loan sharks charge from the poor people. (Interviewee 1, 
Central Bank Officer) 
Contrary to this statement, our fieldwork revealed that interest rates on 
microfinance loans today in Parakatawella exceed 26% per annum, far in excess of the 
12% figure cited here. Driven by these high rates, the microfinance market has grown 
substantially and has now become profitable for many financial institutions. Our 
interviewees told us that every commercial bank, every regional development bank, and 
many NGOs now offer microfinance credit schemes. In Parakatawella alone there are 
eight institutions providing microfinance loans. 
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It must also be noted that although the Central Bank was instrumental in launching 
microfinance in Sri Lanka, microfinance is now largely self-funding. As will be described 
in detail below, microfinance loans are only made to borrowers once they have 
demonstrated their ability to save, by making small regular deposits in a bank account. 
The cumulative effect of these savings is significant. According to available data for 2012, 
total savings in the 14 Sri Lankan microfinance institutions specializing in microfinance 
was US$ 583 million, while total credit was US$ 632 million.2 Thus, 92% of microfinance 
loans in these institutions are financed from the microsavings of the rural villagers 
themselves. The savings accounts pay interest at 6% per annum, while microfinance 
loans we observed charged 2% per month, which compounds to 26.8% per annum.3 
We observed at least three approaches to microfinance in Sri Lankan villages, 
distinguished by their debt collection practices: private banks, “barefoot” banking, and 
banking provided by cooperatives and development organizations. Microfinance through 
private banks relies on male collection agents, riding motorcycles and garbed in leather 
jackets, boots, and helmet. These police-like bank agents show up unannounced and walk 
straight to the microbusiness’s cash drawer, count out the money required to make the 
weekly loan payment, co-sign a piece of paper with the female business owner, and then 
leave abruptly. One of the authors observed how the woman stood apart from the 
collector, with her arms crossed, clearly perturbed and threatened by his presence. 
                                                      
2  These data, extracted from Microfinance Information Exchange (www.mixmarket.org), only include specialised 
microfinance institutions operating in Sri Lanka. Hence, they exclude commercial banks and other finance companies, 
as well as the government-led “Gemidiriya” programme. Therefore these figures understate the overall size of Sri 
Lankan microfinance, which continues to grow rapidly. According to data provided by one of our respondents in a 
major Sri Lankan financial institution, their aggregate microfinance lending expanded 19.2% from 2016 to 2017. 
3 According to a survey by GTZ (German Development Corporation) in 2009, microfinance interest rates varied from 
6% to 36%. However, 6% rate was limited to subsidized credit lines offered by the Central Bank after the 2004 
tsunami. For context, the annual inflation rate in Sri Lanka averaged 6.17% from 2009 to 2013, down from the 
double-digit inflation experienced from 2005 to 2008 (World Bank, 2015). 
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Photographs of the encounter are shown in Figure 2. It is uncertain how the presence of 
the researcher, with his camera, affected the behaviours. 
<< Insert Figure 2 >> 
The second approach to microfinance, so-called “barefoot” banking, does not rely 
on such overt displays of sovereign power. The approach is more congenial. A local man 
walks from business to business. He stops at each business on a weekly basis, just as the 
motorcycle rider does but without the threatening presence. Collection encounters are 
supportive and friendly. 
The third approach, which was our focus in Parakatawella, is practiced by 
cooperative and development banks. It replaces the sovereign power of the motorcycle 
rider and the moral suasion of the barefoot collector with the immaterial labour of 
women. That is, it relies on relationships between borrowers and a hierarchical structure 
of village groups to inculcate financial discipline, as we will describe. 
As our analysis below shows, this form of microfinance positions the so-called “poor 
villager” as the teleological object and the subject upon whom biopower is exercised to 
produce the bankable person. This is in fact the explicit aim of the microfinance program 
we studied. The bankable person is one who has demonstrated financial self-discipline 
and self-government, specifically the abilities to save, borrow and repay. This 
transformation is achieved via three empirically specific mechanisms: (1) animation of 
microfinance projects, (2) corporatizing the village, and (3) assembling biopolitical 
accounts. 
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4.2.1. Animating Microfinance 
We begin with the survey form shown in the Appendix. This form defines a 
particular actor, the field officer, commonly known as the animator,4 who takes these 
survey forms and other evaluation forms from house to house. The animator uses these 
forms to collect baseline information about the local population, including demographic 
and employment information, housing conditions, debt and savings levels, ownership of 
material goods, and access to land. While conducting this survey, he takes the opportunity 
to begin to “animate” village women to get involved in microfinance projects.5 
The animator is the active agent who, together with the forms and tools that he 
carries, transforms the micropractices of “poor villagers” to align with the macro policies 
of the Sri Lankan state. As one microfinance manager explained: 
Each animator is assigned to a particular village or set of potential 
beneficiaries and then those villagers or beneficiaries become his 
responsibility. He has to take care of them … I mean teach them, motivate 
them, help them and make sure that they do things properly. He should be a 
well committed person for the wellbeing of those poor people and he should 
have, you know, a feel of their poverty. He has to be exemplary and a good role 
model. He should make sure that he is in command and that people listen to 
him and follow him. That means he should be a really good leader and we give 
him the required training and education to manage and monitor those people. 
We conduct various leadership workshops as well to make him a leader.… 
Indeed, it is him who does almost everything down there in the villages … and 
he is the one who makes people join our programmes and follow our 
instructions and guidelines. That’s why we call him the animator. 
(Interviewee 2, District Coordinating Officer) 
As noted above, village women in rural Sri Lanka have traditionally gathered in 
small kinship groups to work together informally and to pool their cash. This ciettu 
system, organized primarily around blood relationships and close personal friendships, 
became the target of animators for the formation of small microborrowing groups. The 
                                                      
4 The English word “animator” is used in Sinhalese conversation.  
5 The animator role corresponds in many respects to that of the Mobile Job Trainer in O’Leary’s study of NGOs operating 
amongst the poor in rural India (O’Leary, 2017, p. 28, fn. 5). 
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animators convince groups of women to abandon the traditional mechanism for pooling 
and distributing money and adopt the formal savings and lending systems described in 
detail below. These systems are contingent on the women also abandoning their 
traditional shared work patterns and instead forming individual (or nuclear family-
based) enterprises that sell products into the local market for cash. This has changed the 
women’s relationships: 
Now, “aththan” [collective shared work] is less popular because time is 
different. Women are now attracted to MF projects. Everybody thinks that 
more money could be earned by doing small businesses through MF…. I tell 
you something, when I am in the group, my friend is just a group member. 
Banks wants her name as a group member…. This means that we are group 
members only for books. We keep our friendships [separate from the group]. 
(Interviewee 11, Microfinance Borrower) 
As I said sir, we are working hard and we working for our own families. 
Groups are there for us to consider as a safeguard for securing a loan. Nothing 
else. We are working for own individual needs, individual lives. In the past, 
when we were not linked to any outsider such as a bank, we were somewhat 
collective and much more collaborative. Now, everybody is busy working for 
their loans, to pay the next week’s instalment back. This is highly personal 
though we are linked to groups. As we all know each other, we cannot 
shoulder any responsibility to pay my loan, for example. Instead, we pay by 
ourselves and we work for ourselves. That means people are now so much 
thinking of their own circumstances, unlike in the past. (Interviewee 12, 
Microfinance Borrower) 
The collective labour of past has thus been individualized and turned from gift to 
exchange. 6  And yet, the collective nature of relationships has been harnessed in the 
groups organized by the animator. Kinship and friendship are still the fundamental social 
ties upon which self-help groups are formed. The primary function of these groups, as we 
will discuss in detail below, is to reinforce financial discipline by mutual monitoring, 
encouragement, and collective guarantee. Microfinance in Sri Lanka thus involves not 
                                                      
6 We did hear from the women that they would sometimes pitch in at each other’s businesses, but not as an organized 
group effort. It only occurred when individuals happened to drop in on each other from time to time. 
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simply the introduction of new financial and accounting technologies, but the use of these 
technologies to monetize existing social arrangements while simultaneously 
individualizing labour. 
The success of an animator depends simultaneously on his ability to connect closely 
with the rural villagers and on his position as a representative of the bank: 
They [the villagers] listen to me, they of course have to, because I am not just 
telling them nonsense that I myself invented. I teach them what I have learnt 
from those well-educated gentlemen in the Central Bank. They have a better 
knowledge of these things than any of us here. (Interviewee 6, Animator) 
Mr [name of the animator] is the one who helps us in all aspects. His service is 
indeed immense and we will not be able to do these things without his help. 
He teaches us many things, many things from how to fill forms, keep books, 
write reports, and after all without him we will not be able to take the loan. … 
He attends our meeting, encourage us, and also help resolve problems among 
our women. … We even don’t have to go to the bank to pay our interests, he 
does that for us. … He is a nice good man more than happy to help us and 
indeed we really appreciate what he does (Interviewee 12, Microfinance 
Borrower).   
The animator integrates with the self-help group as the one who brings the 
knowledge from, and connections to, the political system of national development. He 
also works as trainer, supervisor, and monitor on behalf of the bank, operating by and 
large in a pastoral way, embedding disciplinary practices through encouragement and 
care. The animator is thus the agential body placed between, and connecting, the two 
interrelated dimensions of neoliberal governmentality: the disciplinary apparatus for 
working on the anatomo-politics of the body of the poor and the biopolitical apparatus 
for managing the population of the poor. The capacity of animators to fulfill these 
functions is constructed upon (1) their subjectivity as social agents committed to and 
accountable for the betterment of the lives of his/her community members, (2) their 
knowledge of the managerial technologies they carry to the poor, (3) their convivial 
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connection to the poor and knowledge of their relations, whereabouts, behaviours, and 
habits, and (4) their affiliation with institutional apparatuses projected towards the poor. 
The subtle combination of these four attributes makes the animator the fulcrum of 
microaccountability. The animator’s job as a bank employee7 is to align the village with 
the profit motive of the bank and the development agenda set by international 
development agencies and the Central Bank. In this sense, the animator is a “development 
worker” (as opposed to a social worker), and a privatized one at that. The neoliberal 
governance regime exercises its biopower through animators equipped with biopolitical 
and disciplinary tools, such as baseline survey sheets, instruction manuals, loan 
application forms, receipt books, and assessment forms, each serving specific purposes 
(see Table 3). The animators, together with their tools, are the medium through which 
the neoliberal Empire maintains its gaze upon, and fosters the individualization of, the 
rural population, while also serving as the fulcrum by which microfinance institutions 
leverage profits from its “poor enterprising clients.” 
<< Insert Table 3 >> 
Examples of microbusinesses established by microfinance loans in Parakatawella 
include a dairy farm, a recycling business, and a brassware moulding business. In 
interviews, these borrowers spoke glowingly about the effects of microfinance on their 
lives. The dairy farmer owns a few goats from which she collects milk. She used her 
microloan to purchase technology to seal milk bottles and to add different flavours to 
milk. The woman commented that she would never have been able to do this without the 
                                                      
7 Animators can be employed by commercial banks and other lending institutions, including NGOs, on permanent or 
temporary employment contracts. They can also be contracted by the Central Bank for the duration of a particular 
microfinance project. Most of animators employed by commercial banks and NGOs were originally employed and 
trained by the Central Bank. 
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support of microfinance. Her husband is employed selling the products in the market, 
while their children get an undisrupted education, she said. In the recycling business, the 
borrower used her microloan to purchase equipment to produce ashtrays from scrap 
aluminium. The borrower’s husband is employed to operate the equipment. The woman 
is happy that her husband provides labor and that the business has helped them to 
educate their daughter, who has just graduated with a business degree. The business has 
also enabled them to partly build their “dream” house. The woman involved in the other 
microloan used it to establish a business that produces traditional brass household 
ornaments and distributes them through established retail outlets. The woman said she 
has benefitted greatly from the loan and from the collective labour of her husband and 
two sons. She remarked, “I cannot forget ever how mahaththaya [the “gentleman”, 
referring to the animator] motivated us to start this journey.” Although it is not clear that 
these comments can be taken completely at face value, in that they may have been 
influenced by the context of describing their experiences to a male professor visiting the 
village from abroad, it does seem incontrovertible that the microloans had a significant 
effect on the labour practices of these families, and a substantive effect on the educational 
opportunities of the children. 
 These businesses provide ancillary benefits for families as well, through their 
impact on the husbands. One woman told us: 
My husband has been an alcoholic. He earned daily from [his job at] a garage. 
When I started getting money from the bank, I said to him to work for me…. 
So, he has less time and money for drinking daily…. My husband is now serious 
about [our daughter’s] future also. He is much responsible now. (Interviewee 
13, Microfinance Borrower) 
Her husband added: 
Yes, this is correct. I now have realised the importance of this business and 
the money to be kept for our daughter’s marriage…. Also, X [his friend with 
whom he drank] can’t find time to get together for a drink. His wife is also 
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getting him to more work at home now in their bakery business. (Interviewee 
14, Husband of Microfinance Borrower) 
Each of the borrowers is a member of one of the small groups organized by an 
animator. For financial institutions offering microfinance credit, these small groups are 
simultaneously a major source of their liquidity, as noted above, and a social mechanism 
to mitigate default risk. Peer pressure, which is especially intense in these groups due to 
the concentration of familial relations, is mobilised not only to promote individual and 
group savings but also to ensure the recovery of microfinance loans. This is made explicit 
in a report by M-CRIL, a microfinance rating agency, in their risk assessment report on 
Sarvodaya SEEDS, a leading microfinance provider: 
SEEDS should aim to generate greater peer pressure within societies for 
ensuring loan repayments. A thrust on group level interaction through regular 
meetings, entrusting responsibility for collecting and depositing member 
savings and repayments and recovering arrears from group savings to the 
group leader are some of the steps which could be considered. (M-CRIL, 2002) 
Accordingly, the self-help group is a disciplinary space, built on existing village 
relationships. In this space, individuals are subjected to the continuous gaze of the 
neoliberal development state, operating not just through the animators but also through 
family members and friends, who are themselves implicated through a surety agreement 
described below. For the bank, default risk is mitigated by spreading it amongst the group 
members. As one Central Bank employee commented, “If they can’t or are not willing to 
take that risk for their group members, how can they be entrepreneurs?” (Interviewee 5, 
Microfinance Trainer). 
In addition to the fostering of mutual monitoring amongst group members, direct 
efforts are made by the banks and the government to change the habitus of the individual 
group members, to get them to think in economic terms. Community training and 
education play a significant role (cf. Walker, 2014, p. 223 on the educative role of 
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accounting in rural rehabilitation in the US in the 1930s). Compulsory learning sessions 
build financial discipline. As a microfinance manager told us: 
[T]he best thing perhaps in this microfinance is not simply lending to the poor 
but cultivating saving habit [sic] and a banking culture among the poor…. [W]e 
managed to do this with lots of efforts that included forming self-help groups 
as well as teaching them the importance of good financial disciplines. It is glad 
to see these poor people now know how to carefully think of their income and 
set aside at least a very small amount as regular savings. (Interviewee 4, 
District Coordinating Officer) 
“Teaching” here refers to the compulsory workshops that each group member 
attends at village training centres. These workshops deliver standard training modules 
designed by the GTZ, ILO and the World Bank. They include preliminary sessions that 
highlight “financial disciplines and saving habits,” followed by advanced sessions of 
“SIYB” (Start and Improve Your Own Business), “KAB” (Know About Business), “Value 
Chain Development” and also “SCORE” (Sustaining Competitive and Responsible 
Enterprises) modules.8 
These modules are intended to formalize the practices of the women as 
entrepreneurs, through the inculcation of basic and generic business thinking. As one 
training manager stated, the courses: 
… perhaps seem a bit too much for these villagers sometimes, especially if you 
think of the types of businesses they are doing. They are just running a small 
chicken farm or a vegetable garden. Sometimes they just need a microfinance 
loan to buy a three-wheeler or a motorbike to deliver their product to the 
market in the town or to buy a fishing boat. They are of course not inventing 
a new business but just want some financial help to do what they were doing 
bit better. Key issues for them perhaps is not learning how to do a proper set 
of accounts and business management basics but finding a market and good 
price for their products, which has always been the trouble and they are 
always in the receiving end when you think of the market competition, 
nothing but to sell their products so cheap. But it is also necessary [for] them 
to follow all those courses believing that they would help them. Perhaps they 
may for some. At least, I reckon, these sessions make them feel the importance 
                                                      
8 These financial education modules build upon a high degree of basic literacy. The literacy rate in Sri Lanka is 91.2% 
(UNICEF, 2015). 
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of going to the bank every week … On the other hand, you should not expect a 
very direct impact from these learning modules as they are not teaching you 
how to do your specific business. (Interviewee 7, Microfinance Training 
Manager) 
We found in our interviews with local women that their microbusinesses were not 
simply “what they were doing” already, because under microfinance, their labour 
practices changed from a sharing economy (described previously) to an exchange 
economy. This transformation of labour goes hand in hand with the transformation of 
habitus through financial education and the rituals of the group meetings. The result, in 
the words of a bank official responsible for the design and regulation of microfinance 
projects, is the creation of a “bankable person”: 
… starting from an un-bankable person, we transform him (sic) into a 
bankable person, that’s what we [the microfinance institutions] do. 
(Interviewee 1, Central Bank Officer) 
This transformation is noted by the women borrowers, too: 
In the past, people were not that active because they had no instalment to pay 
in a day or so. Now, we are all active in our businesses and think of profits very 
seriously and save cash for next payments. In other words, people are very 
much business minded and earn more than before. (Interviewee 12, 
Microfinance Borrower) 
The notion of “bankability” here comprises not only one’s capacity to save and 
borrow and make loan payments, but also the acculturated capacity to maintain a 
prescribed set of accounting records. As Foucault (2008) pointed out, this sort of 
transformative intervention to render the individual body docile yet productive is a 
distinctive feature of neoliberal governmentality, which simultaneously transforms 
culture to inculcate values of entrepreneurship and human capital. In the next section, we 
discuss the diffuse structures, processes and biopolitical technologies that are applied at 
the village level to facilitate this individual transformation. 
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4.2.2. Corporatizing the Village 
Embedded within the logic of microfinance is a paradox: the very pathological trait 
of the poor (that is, their poverty) that attracts the attention of microfinance programs is 
the one that renders them not “creditworthy” and hence not bankable. The Sri Lankan 
solution to this paradox has been to construct a disciplinary apparatus to mitigate the 
credit risk. Through this disciplinary apparatus, the necessary social and cultural (but not 
necessarily economic) capital of poor individuals is constructed to operate as “collateral” 
for the loans they will receive.  
Regarding the involvement of the state in microfinance, Yunus and Jolis (2001, p. 
214) claim that “government, as we know it today, should pull out of most things except 
for law enforcement and justice, national defense and foreign policy, and let the private 
sector, a Grameenized private sector, a social-consciousness-driven private sector, take 
over their other functions.” In sharp contrast to this liberal ideal, the Sri Lanka 
government plays an interventionist role. The Ministry of Finance leads the government’s 
flagship rural development programme, the Gemidiriya (“Village Strength”), aimed at 
reconfiguring villages into corporate forms suited to the needs of microcredit. The project 
appraisal document, written by the Ministry of Economic Development in conjunction 
with the World Bank, says: 
The objective … is to build a sustainable village-based savings and credit 
system that will expand opportunities for income generation for people who 
do not currently have access to loans from formal financial institutions and to 
enhance their access to formal financial institutions as their businesses 
prosper. This sub-component will assist setting up of a Village Savings and 
Credit Organization (VSCO) which all villagers will join. … There will be 
specialized institutional arrangements … consisting of Small Groups (SGs), 
Cluster Committees (CCs) and Village Savings and Credit Committee (VSCC) … 
Critical to the success of this … are: (i) the development of strong VOs [Village 
Organizations] whose members have a deep sense of ownership and a vision 
for long-term sustainability; (ii) a governance structure that empowers the 
members; (iii) transparent guidelines for fund management; and (iv) a 
reliable accounting and loan tracking system. In order to maximize prospects 
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for long-term sustainability, the project will develop detailed policies and 
procedures adapted from the VSHLI [Village Self-Help Learning Initiative] 
model, an accounting and loan tracking system that the villagers can manage 
themselves and provide extensive high-quality training to communities. 
(World Bank, 2004) 
In the above passage, the Sri Lankan government sets out the institutional 
structures within which “poor enterprising clients” become and are maintained as 
bankable. To this end, the state intervenes into peripheral villages, inserting accounting 
technologies like the “VSHLI” (the system based on the cashbook shown in Figure 1) and 
corporatizing the village itself by imposing a new hierarchical structure. This structure 
we represent graphically in Figure 3. 
<< Insert Figure 3 >> 
At the very bottom of this hierarchical order are the self-help groups organized by 
the animators. In the previous section, we looked at how these groups function at the 
micro level. Here we look at how they serve the purpose of restructuring the village. 
Corresponding to our field observations and interview data, the Ministry of Economic 
Development’s project appraisal document summarises the ‘official’ character of the 
borrowing groups as: 
… small groups of 5-7 members with similar interests and economic 
situations. These groups will self-select their members, save together and 
mutually guarantee each other’s loans. Each group will decide upon a weekly 
savings amount based on the savings capabilities of group members. Interest 
will be paid on these savings based on the interest rate paid by the bank where 
the funds are held and taking into account of expenses incurred in managing 
the account. After saving for three months, members will be eligible for loans. 
The other members of the small group will appraise their loan applications, as 
they are in a good position to know the capabilities and economic 
opportunities of individual members. (World Bank, 2004) 
This small group is a key building block in corporatizing the villages and the 
“insertion point” of villagers into the machinery of microfinance. Group membership is 
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defined and governed by a constitution predesigned for such groups by the project 
officers (see Figure 4).  
<< Insert Figure 4 >> 
The constitution has both discursive and punitive elements of discipline built into 
it. Discursively, it sets out the noble aims of growth and development and the potential 
capacity of villagers to make a positive contribution, individually and collectively, 
towards the nation’s development goals. Hence, it carries certain ideological apparatuses 
of a ‘development state’ and ties the individual interests to the collective interests of the 
nation. It offers a taken-for-granted instrumentality of savings and credit for economic 
prosperity and development. It reconfigures existing kinship relations into a set of 
relations for production, oriented towards financial savings and borrowing. Punitively, 
the constitution sets out the penalties for deviant behaviour; for example, financial fines 
for non-attendance for group meetings and training sessions, and for not maintaining the 
required accounts of their economic activities. Most importantly, active engagement in 
these group activities is necessary to ensure one’s eligibility for microfinance loans. 
Power in microfinance thus operates at the level of the individual body through 
formalized group membership. 
Each small group is a “village society” run by elected officers: president, secretary 
and treasurer. The treasurer keeps the cashbook, recording all receipts of membership 
fees and loan repayments, and all payments including loans and expenses. Apart from the 
accounting activity that the cashbook directs to the periodical preparation of final 
accounts, it is the cashbook itself that serves as part of the “milieu” in which people make 
decisions (Foucault, 2008). These decisions are based on conversations and discussions 
during meetings that centre on the cashbook, establishing its discursive significance by 
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mobilizing the numbers it contains and connecting them to past behaviours and future 
possibilities. This gives the cashbook a significance that extends beyond the meetings: 
Now, we keep transactions in cashbook. We look at the past transaction to see 
how we do the things. We use them when discussing the matters with family 
members. … I know how to keep a cashbook. And, I know how we read and 
use them for daily purposes. Last week, I wanted to think about the next 
month’s repayment. I got the cashbook and made an observation about 
possible savings based on previous months receipts and payments. 
(Interviewee 13, Microfinance Borrower)  
Thus, the discussion of the cashbook at meetings guides group members “towards 
economically and socially desirable behaviours” (Munro, 2012, p. 348). The cashbook-
inspired behaviour is of paramount importance, as the treasurer of a self-help group 
described: 
We have a book to talk about our daily affairs. I present the figures in the 
cashbook at our regular meetings and use the same for answering the 
questions. Some come to know what others did in the weeks before and 
compare the things with each other and assess how everybody grows. 
(Interviewee 8, Small Group Treasurer) 
In addition to these performative economic rituals around cashbook figures, 
members talk about underlying social factors bearing on their economic experience: 
We then know who is performing better and who is not and why. This could 
be a family matter such as child’s educational need or teen-aged daughter’s 
big-day ceremony or the rise of raw material prices. We all share these good 
and bad things. (Interviewee 8, Small Group Treasurer) 
Even though the neoliberal expectation is that individuals will act according to 
market principles, the above quote shows that decisions within the group are made not 
purely in the economic terms of the cashbook, but also in terms of social relations 
(“family,” “child,” “daughter,” “we all”) and cultural dynamics (“big-day ceremony,” which 
is a point of passage for youth), which also help form the “decision-making milieu” 
(Munro, 2012, p. 349). In this sense, the neoliberal self being produced in microfinance is 
“someone who accepts reality” (Foucault, 2008, p. 269) and “who responds 
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systematically to the modifications in the variables of the environment” (Foucault, 2008, 
p. 270). Thus, microaccountability within the group, enacted around the cashbook, 
manifests the adjusted realities and the requisite responses without which microfinance 
is untenable. Microfinance, as a quintessential individualizing neoliberal tool of 
governance, depends deeply and paradoxically on the social connectedness of one 
villager to another. 
This social connectedness is further harnessed in Sri Lankan microfinance by 
assembling the small groups into larger village structures, as shown in Figure 3. The small 
groups are gathered into clusters, where the groups are represented by one or two of 
their members. The various clusters come together in the Village Savings and Credit 
Organization, which all the village borrowers belong to. “The Village Saving and Credit 
Organization is just like a big business, like a big company,” said one woman (Interviewee 
12, Microfinance Borrower). The village organization itself participates at the district 
level through various committees for savings and credit, finance, and auditing, as well as 
boards of directors, as shown in the figure. 
Thus, the immaterial labour of the individual borrowers at the level of the small 
group, in monitoring and encouraging each other, is assembled into hierarchical form to 
enable the biopolitical governance of the village.  
4.2.3. Assembling Biopolitical Accounts 
Along with these village governance structures, a form of accounting has been 
created for Sri Lankan microfinance projects. It involves the construction of various 
accounts that make the financial performance of the women villagers, both individual and 
aggregated, visible at the micro and macro levels. 
At the micro level, savings performance is measured in terms of the regularity of an 
individual’s deposits and the amount deposited. Each member is expected to deposit at 
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least an agreed-upon weekly amount (so-called “compulsory savings”) to demonstrate 
the acquisition of saving habits. For this purpose, each woman is given a “savings 
passbook” in which the animator records every deposit she makes. The individual keeps 
this passbook as a record in which she can see her own progress and demonstrate it to 
others. 
The animator also records the deposit in the group savings account on the woman’s 
behalf. Each month, the monthly balance and cash flows from the collective group account 
are read aloud in the group meeting and reconciled with the individual passbook entries. 
This draws attention to individual behaviours but also makes visible the group’s 
collective behaviour. 
Individuals, if they wish, can also make contributions over the agreed upon amount 
(so-called “voluntary savings”). We witnessed these extra savings being applauded and 
hailed as “above average performance.” 
No member can withdraw her deposited money (this is not the same as taking a 
loan) during the first year of her savings. Any withdrawals by a member after that must 
be agreed upon by all members of the group. 
An individual’s savings behaviours are taken into account in the approval process 
when they eventually apply for a microfinance loans. In addition, a loan application is 
approved if and only if other group members are willing to sign a “surety agreement.” 
This means, clearly, that loans cannot be obtained without belonging to a group. The loan 
amount is not specifically conditioned on the amount the individual has saved. Rather, 
the woman’s membership in the group, its willingness to sign a surety agreement for her 
loan, and her own demonstration of regular savings behaviour for a minimum of three 
months, together constitute the cultural collateral for the loan. 
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Once a loan is approved, an individual loan account is set up to record loan 
repayments. As with the individual and group savings accounts, the individual loan 
account is used to monitor and display to the group the continued financial discipline of 
the borrower. The success of any further loan applications will depend upon the 
regularity of entries in this account. 
The heart of microaccountability, in this context, is that one’s savings and 
borrowing behaviours are made visible within the group. When asked if the relationships 
between women had become competitive because they could all see who was saving most 
or repaying on time, a woman said: 
They are not competitive. Nothing to compete. Instead, they are struggling. 
Everybody has a loan payment if they in the group. They meet and talk. Talk 
in the regular microfinance meeting. We discuss the problems. But, we are not 
collective for payments. Individuals must take the responsibility. Last week, 
[name of friend] wants me to help her payment. I said I can’t. Because I cannot 
think of this with all my payment commitments. I said to her I will try to help 
her next month – just to keep the relationship. In the microfinance meeting, 
we all share these personal troubles but nobody cannot help. We have to help 
ourselves. (Interviewee 11, Microfinance Borrower) 
The woman understands that she is subject to scrutiny by her friends, relatives, and 
neighbours. She also reveals that the bonds that formerly led women to work for each 
other for free have, to an extent, been severed. The women are no longer able to help each 
other in times of need. They make promises to help that they know they cannot keep, in 
order to maintain their friendships. 
The solidarity of women is not without some effectiveness: 
Recently, one of our group members was short of money. We collectively 
talked to the collector and got a two-day extension without any extra 
payment. She was scared to talk to him personally but me and another joined 
her to solve this. Later, she made the payment promptly. (Interviewee 16, 
Microfinance Borrower) 
This shows that the women, together, are not entirely passive in the face of pressure 
from microfinance institutions. However, it also shows that their collective agency serves 
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the needs of those institutions well, in that the woman’s loan payment was eventually 
made. 
The women’s difficulty in maintaining regular loan payments is compounded by the 
fact that they often juggle multiple loans. While we never saw it acknowledged in the 
brochures and reports of microfinance institutions, the women are typically clients of 
several institutions at once: 
Prices are so high. Our wants are so high…. We have relations but we do have 
to pay more attention [to loans] than other things as the loan collector is 
definitely coming next Wednesday and another on Sunday and another on 
Monday…. This is why I said in a way this is a trap. (Interviewee 12, 
Microfinance Borrower) 
The woman reveals that she is struggling to make payments on at least three loans, 
and feels trapped by microfinance instead of liberated. Other women indicated that they 
sometimes use their business loan proceeds for personal needs, and even borrow from 
one institution just to make payments on a loan at another: 
When I faced the problem of finding money for my daughter’s education, I 
used some from my microfinance money. My husband encouraged me to do 
this. Then, my husband and I worked harder to find this money. Our bakery 
business developed with that hope. Husband not only baked the things 
without anybody’s help (other than me), but also he delivered around this 
village and the one next to us. So, we managed somehow to pay the money 
[back]. Our own labour helped a lot unlike in the past because of the 
responsibility we must pay the loans. One problem though was that we had to 
get another two loans to pay the other loans. I am not sure what is going to 
happen but we feel that we have taken care of ourselves better than before. 
(Interviewee 13, Microfinance Borrower) 
The effects of microfinance proclaimed by enthusiasts like Yunus and Jolis (2001) 
are thus revealed to be somewhat mixed: although the women told us of now being able 
to afford books and education for their children, or improvements to their homes, they 
have become enmeshed in a web of debt that they cannot escape. 
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Our observation of group meetings suggested that the reading of accounts and 
narrations of behaviours was somewhat ceremonial, even quasi-religious.9 Each woman 
is called to account formally and ritualistically in the meetings, in front of family and 
friends. This calling to account echoes beyond the group meeting: 
One of my relatives comes and visits me on and off, almost once a week, and 
asks about my daughter’s education and my bakery business. She also asks me 
whether I can pay the loans on time…. If bank gentlemen come and say to us 
that there is a possibility of difficulty in [someone] paying loans, then we get 
angry and urge her to do something about it because we cannot think of 
paying on her behalf at all…. This happened only once to my relative. She then 
did not visit us for a while as my husband scolded her but it lasts only a week 
or so. Children come and make us friendly again. (Interviewee 13, 
Microfinance Borrower) 
As this quotation indicates, when a borrower encounters a fellow group member in 
everyday life, she recognizes her not just as family member or friend but as a person for 
whom she has signed a surety agreement. This imposes an economic character on 
traditional social relations, and an emotional and social character on economic 
accountability (Kosmala & McKernan, 2011; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991). However, 
the transformation of relationships is not complete: 
In a way, we have a same feeling like in the case of ciettu. We trust each other 
and we all have a responsibility make the payment. Our relations are more 
than business. They are our neighbours, relatives or intimate friends. We 
share a lot of things – meals, tools and equipment, firewood, labour, and 
happiness and sadness, etc. Whatever we do, they know. Whatever we do they 
ask about them. That is exactly our life. (Interviewee 12, Microfinance 
Borrower) 
Indeed, in some ways the microborrowing group practices have intensified social 
relationships: 
We used to keep problems to ourselves. We used to tolerate. Instead, we 
[now] talk about the problems. Yesterday, my neighbour came and talked to 
me about her husband’s behaviour [drunkenness] which causes her loan 
                                                      
9 Compare this to the role of morning ceremonies in linking ideological control and management control systems at a 
religiously-affiliated medical NGO in India, in Kraus, Kennergren, and von Unge (2017).  
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payment problems. But she did not ask me to help. She comes and talks. That’s 
it. It is a relief for her as well. I do the same with her when I face similar 
problems. (Interviewee 16, Microfinance Borrower) 
Because of the intensity of these relationships, the accounting at the micro level 
need not be technically complex in order to be powerful. Individuals and groups must 
ensure that their accounts portray their financial discipline in order to reassure family 
and friends, and also so that they can be considered bankable and worthy of receiving 
further credit. Of course, similar accounts exist in lending arrangements outside of 
microfinance regimes, but they are not normally visible to other parties. They are private 
information used by the individual and her bank. In the microfinance accountability 
regime of Sri Lanka, however, such accounts are open to the scrutiny of the small group. 
They are also visible to other levels of the village’s institutional arrangements, such as the 
Saving and Credit Subcommittee (see Figure 3). 
The savings and loan accounts are supplemented in small group and village 
subcommittee discussions by other accounting information, such as business plans and 
budgets that must accompany each loan application. Villagers are taught how to produce 
these, and how to maintain a simple set of accounts for their own businesses, consisting 
of a cash book and an expense and income record. The simplicity of these accounts is 
instrumental in effecting the desired behavioural changes. 10  Together, the accounts 
provide sufficient detail for villagers to measure their profit on a cash basis. More than 
an assessment of profit, however, these recordkeeping practices have a disciplinary 
impact upon the villagers. As one of the villagers commented: 
It is not a big thing, just writing down every payment I do and all money I 
receive properly in couple of school exercise books. But they tell me where 
have all my money gone. At the end of the day, it helps me to keep an eye on 
my spending so that I can make sure I have enough to put in the bank. … Only 
                                                      
10Compare Carlsson-Wall, Kraus, Lund, and Sjögren (2016) on the use of simple accounting metaphors in fostering 
organizational change. 
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thing is that you have to keep all your bills and receipts with you unless you 
may forget the amounts and date, and also you need to spend half an hour or 
so everyday sorting out these things. (Interviewee 10, Microfinance 
Borrower) 
Though simple, these accounts, when coupled with the discursive apparatuses of 
groups and animators, have a significant disciplinary impact. They provide the villagers 
with a mirror through which they can now reflect daily upon their life activities and 
capacities in terms that link their life choices to their cash flows. Daily life activities are 
now seen as expenditure categories that need to be managed in order to ensure the timely 
and regular payment of compulsory savings and loan installments. 
However, the effects of this discipline are not limited to the production of 
conformity and financial habitus. The women are conscious of their own agency and 
power in their relationship with the microfinance industry: 
We now have realised how to live without someone’s help. We have come to 
know that we ourselves are the mighty power in gaining advantages of these 
programmes and government help. Their help is not useful if we have not 
prepared to get them. We cannot get them if we have not been determined to 
organise ourselves. (Interviewee 13, Microfinance Borrower) 
Taken together, the accounts that individuals and groups maintain and that 
animators and other local officers monitor, operate to concentrate and focus the gaze on 
village lives. This encloses individuals in a disciplinary “space without walls,” constructed 
from group membership, group meetings, the loan scheme, the woman’s relationship 
with a specific animator, and attendance at training programmes. And yet, the women 
sense their own power and purpose within these immaterial structures. 
At the macro level, accounting connects these enclosed, regimented and yet 
empowered bodies to the larger schemes for managing the population. We do not wish 
to elaborate too much on this because it would take our focus away from the village 
women. However, it is important to note that the women’s accounting does have broader 
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socioeconomic implications. At this level, their aggregated accounts feed the biopolitical 
technologies that assess the microfinance industry as a whole, and its institutions. Here, 
the focus is on the assessment of microfinance as a strategy for managing the pathology 
of poverty in the population as a whole. In practical terms, this includes the collection and 
upward processing of data, to compile accounts of how each microfinance programme is 
progressing. These are aimed at a political readership and constitute an element of wider 
political suasion. In this mode, accounting demonstrates and legitimates microfinance as 
an efficient policy framework for rural development. 
This accounting draws on animators’ monthly reports, constructed from the various 
group and individual record books and group meeting minutes. It also draws on 
individual loan applications that include business plans and budget forms. At the village 
level, a picture is constructed of savings behaviour, business activity, lending patterns, 
and loan recovery data. 
These accounts are also compiled using the survey tools and information sheets 
filled out by the animators. Data are aggregated at the village, regional and national levels. 
The aggregated accounts and narratives include photo and video evidence of village 
projects and programmes. Examples are provided in Figure 5. 
<< Insert Figure 5 >> 
These accounts are published in annual reports, special reports, web sites and 
newsletters of various development corporations, such as the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, and international NGOs. They circulate as well amongst 
governmental institutions and departments, such as the Central Bank and the Ministry of 
Economic Development. The accounts thus feed the institutional apparatuses that 
manage poverty in the population. 
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4.3. Resume 
The above analysis has shown how the repurposing of traditional forms, such as the 
ciettu system, has been accomplished in order to make microfinance in Sri Lanka 
possible. This has been done through the activities of the animator, who identifies and 
gathers women to form borrowing groups, guides them to make regular savings deposit, 
and connects them to microfinance loans that reshape their traditional economic 
activities into microenterprises. We have seen how the village itself is transformed and 
harnessed to the needs of the microfinance industry by the installation of hierarchical 
organizational elements, including boards and committees. We have seen how the 
individual, within the small group environment, is subjected to a disciplinary gaze that 
renders her savings and borrowing behaviours discussable at the micro level. Finally, we 
have seen how the individual and small group accounting data is aggregated and 
assembled into biopolitical accounts that circulate amongst the government and 
transnational institutions governing microfinance. 
In the following section, we draw specific inferences from this analysis in order to 
further develop the theorization adopted in Section 2. 
5. DISCUSSION 
At the outset of the paper, we underlined a stream of accounting research that 
addressed the question of how the individual self is constructed in accountable 
relationships, that is, those involving the demand for, and provision of, reasons for 
conduct (Kosmala & McKernan, 2011; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991; Roberts & Scapens, 
1985). This literature inspired us to look at microfinance, initially, through a Foucauldian 
lens of disciplinary power. However, we soon came to realize that the mechanisms of 
accountability we were looking at were open, pervasive, and adaptable, and had little to 
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do with the kinds of regimented enclosures normally associated with disciplinary power, 
such as the factory or the prison. In accounting research, relatively little attention has 
been paid to how accountability is practised beyond disciplinary enclosures, according to 
Martinez (2011), who points to biopolitics (Foucault, 2008), societies of control (Deleuze, 
1992), and “Empire” (Hardt & Negri, 2000) as appropriate theorizations for such a task. 
By adopting these theorizations, our analysis has allowed us to begin to understand 
how disciplinary governance of individuals and biopolitical governance of populations 
come together in Sri Lankan microfinance to produce a capillary network of accounting 
and accountability that pervades everyday life, moving towards a society of control. Our 
empirics confirm what others have noted (e.g., Munro, 2012), that biopolitics does not 
mean the end of disciplinary technologies. Rather, we see in microfinance that 
disciplinary technologies have been deployed in association with biopolitical ones to 
produce a new form of village life, predicated on the neoliberal transformation of the 
individual into an entrepreneur of the self. 
The key to this complex mode of governance, we are arguing, is what we have called 
microaccountability: the organization of small daily accountabilities, of one friend to 
another and one family member to another, into a flexible network of control. In the 
following discussion, we highlight how microaccountability is used in microfinance to 
bring together disciplinary power and biopolitical governance, extending neoliberal 
governance through the fabrication of a society of control. 
5.1. Microfinance as Disciplinary Power 
As a prototypical form of neoliberal governance, microfinance fashions a terrain for 
the production of the neoliberal self. This is the explicit aim of the microfinance model: 
the construction of the bankable person. The “poor enterprising client” is the body upon 
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which that power is ultimately focused; it is the body which, as a heterotopian mirror 
(Foucault & Miskowiec, 1986), reflects neoliberalism in action. 
Microfinance uses accounting technologies to foster the self-examination at the 
heart of disciplinary power. Individual savings records must be maintained by the would-
be microborrower. These become the mirror of the self for each village woman, while her 
group’s cashbook puts her individual’s savings behaviours into the context of group 
behaviours. Group meetings, where savings and credit behaviours are recited, provide 
the ritualized setting for the individual’s self-disclosure and self-narration. In her 
accounting records, the woman must “decipher” herself (Foucault, 2003b, p. 146). In the 
public disclosure of these records, the woman must reconcile herself with the 
expectations and obligations of her peers, who must see her develop into a bankable 
person or face the prospect of repaying her debts for her. 
Accounting records alone are thus insufficient in microfinance as a means of 
creating the bankable person. Group membership is crucial here. The self-help groups are 
where the requisite disciplines, attitudes, and behaviours – the habitus – of the bankable 
person are inculcated. Indeed, microfinance only becomes profitable through the 
reorganization of social relations and the exploitation of associated social norms. In 
wealthy societies, the cost of invigilating loans is often born by the lender, which employs 
professional finance experts, trained staff, and computer algorithms to assess risk and to 
identify deviations from the expected loan repayment patterns. In microfinance, 
however, the amount of each individual loan is so small that it is not profitable for the 
bank to hire an employee to monitor the loans. Instead, the villagers are put to work 
under a habitus of new financial behaviours, developed through explicit training and 
practice. Group members monitor each other and provide accounts to each other 
willingly because they and their family members and neighbours all depend on renewals 
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and extensions of their microloans. This microaccountability is not simply the capture of 
interpersonal accountability, but its reinforcement and amplification. The orchestration 
of the group meetings, with the ritual readings of accounts by the group treasurer, 
resembles a religious exercise that informs the shared beliefs of the group and makes 
deviation from those beliefs unthinkable. Regular visits by animators and loan officers 
ensure the continuing observation of these rituals.  
The building of routines and habits through the practice of compulsory savings thus 
ritualizes the behaviours necessary for participation in the banking game. This is a game 
in the sense that borrowers come to learn certain rules and practices. Hence, one must 
sit and absorb the stories of the existing borrowers, learn the importance of adherence 
to the group’s norms, and become a verified depositor, before obtaining any credit. The 
lender thereby ensures there is little risk to the bank in advancing credit, as each woman 
borrower has adopted all the necessary habits, beliefs, and rules of the game before 
receiving her loan. 
This disciplinary practice is gendered as well. It is no coincidence that in Sri Lankan 
microfinance, the bank employees doing the lending and collecting tend to be men, while 
women do the borrowing and repaying. This gender division is silently pronounced, 
socially embedded and, in turn, unquestionable. In fact, the banks consider most village 
men to be unsuitable as borrowers, due in part to what the bank officials perceive as 
excessive alcohol consumption, something confirmed by our interviewees. Instead, 
village men provide material labour to the microenterprises run by their wives. Women 
are chosen as the targets of microfinance programs because theirs was a hidden form of 
labour in traditional society. The singular accomplishment of microfinance is arguably to 
have surfaced this hidden labour and monetized it, for this is what legitimizes 
microfinance and allows it to claim that it has fostered economic activity. However,  the 
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less visible accomplishment is to have organized convivial social relations into a system 
of immaterial labour to invigilate loans and manage risk. Together, these 
accomplishments enable the banks to earn a profit from the now-disciplined poor. 
5.2. Microfinance as Biopolitical Governance 
Our analysis showed that establishing microfinance in Sri Lanka has also required 
intervention at the level of the population, through the collection of detailed demographic 
data and the restructuring of the village based on this data. The demographic data is used 
to assess whether the village is poor enough to be suitable for intervention through the 
technologies of microfinance. The task of collecting this data provides the animator with 
the opportunity to begin to foster microfinance discourse and to identify networks of 
existing relationships that can be organized into self-help groups. These groups are 
gathered, via a system of representatives, into clusters, which are themselves gathered 
together hierarchically to form the Village Savings and Credit Organization. 
This biopolitical observation and restructuring of the population enables 
microfinance to penetrate the village, and facilitates the collection and circulation of 
aggregated loan data for analysis within national and transnational financial institutions. 
Hence microfinance is quintessentially biopolitical, in that it is a way of exercising power 
“over persons specifically in so far as they are thought of as living beings: a politics 
concerned with subjects as members of population, in which issues of individual … 
conduct intersect with issues of national policy and power” (Gordon, 1991, pp. 4-5). 
The reorganization of labour practices and informal relations in this environment 
constitute microaccountability as a centrifugal force of the global financial market that 
permits the circulation of capital into heretofore unexploited regions and activities. 
Microfinance thus operates as a mechanism for producing knowledge and circulating 
capital, while penetrating and adapting the traditional social structures of the Sri Lankan 
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village. It is the paradox of microfinance that individual economic self-reliance can only 
be promoted through heavy dependence upon traditional social and family relationships. 
It is because of these relationships that women in the self-help groups understand 
the interdependence of their actions, which Roberts (1991) says is what distinguishes 
social from hierarchical accountability. Interdependence is what makes 
microaccountability crucial to microfinance, for as Butler (2005) argues, self-
understanding begins in relationship. The self-formation of the individual entrepreneur 
thus begins not with individual risk-taking, but with an obligation to others (see also 
Messner, 2009; Shearer, 2002). Microaccountability, instantiated through biopolitical 
reorganization of the population, brings the emotion and affection of interpersonal 
relationships into the act of providing an individual account. 
The exploitation of these interpersonal relationships in microfinance is coupled 
with the use of explicit accounting mechanisms. We saw that the cashbook and bank 
account were embodied and enacted in regular group meetings, bringing each individual 
woman’s financial behaviours into social context. These accounting records thus form the 
basis of a surveillance that connects the macro with the micro. As long as the individual 
records and the cashbook are simple enough for the village women to comprehend and 
use, despite their lack of preparedness for commercial banking, they permit the banks to 
penetrate the body politic of the village. By bringing accounting technologies into play 
socially, microaccountability thus fashions a neoliberal site within the village. 
5.3. Microaccountability in the Society of Control 
Although microaccountability acts as a centrifugal force for extending the global 
economic and financial markets, our analysis suggests that at the local level, this market 
remains perpetually incomplete. With regard to the poor becoming bankable, individual 
borrowers in Sri Lankan microfinance must remain borrowers, seemingly in perpetuity, 
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because the “enterprises” financed by microcredit typically have no potential to scale up. 
What little profit is earned is only (perhaps) sufficient to repay one loan in time for the 
borrower to take on another one. Indeed, we learned that some women take loans from 
one microfinance institution in order to pay their existing loans with another. While some 
microentrepreneurs do better than others, virtually no one graduates to commercial 
credit featuring material collateral and lower interest rates. Accordingly, the individuals 
are not entrepreneurs in the full sense, but perpetual entrepreneurs-in-waiting. This is 
consistent with the argument of Deleuze that “in the societies of control one is never 
finished anything” (1992, p. 5). Just as perpetual education has replaced the notion of 
fixed periods of school attendance, so perpetual borrowing has replaced the notion of 
paying off loans. The inability of the individual to transcend the bounds of the credit 
market is linked directly to her inability to transcend the bounds of the local market for 
goods. 
In microfinance, therefore, material production is incidental and relatively 
unimportant, except for symbolic and rhetorical purposes. What matters is the 
circulation of productive surplus through the immaterial labour of the villagers. Hardt 
and Negri (2000) attribute these communicative, symbolic and affective elements of 
immaterial labour to post-Fordist developments in advanced manufacturing in global 
centres. However, our analysis shows that the immaterialization of labour goes a step 
further within the Global South. Microfinance immaterializes labour without the aid of 
high technology and advanced manufacturing. In doing this, it displaces and distributes 
the primary functions of capital, namely the management of production and the bearing 
of risk. In a microfinance regime, capital no longer purchases labour and translates it into 
labour power within a disciplinary settings such as a factory. Instead, capital distributes 
the job of raising and managing capital to the labourers themselves, in the guise of 
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entrepreneurship, so that poor villagers, who would otherwise labour outside the 
capitalist system or perhaps sell their material labour to capital for wages, now bear the 
financial risks of their own labour. Microfinance thus enables capital to earn a return for 
a risk it neither bears nor manages. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has brought together literature on accountability, biopolitics, and 
postmodern production to provide an analysis and critique of microfinance. We have 
shown how accountability at the level of interpersonal relationships, microaccountability, 
has been harnessed to make microfinance profitable. Microaccountability brings emotion 
and affection into the act of rendering an account (Kosmala & McKernan, 2011; Messner, 
2009), overcoming the limits of the bank’s discursive structures for providing accounts 
(Butler, 2005; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991) while making invigilation of small loans 
cost effective. 
Our case study has provided insight into the mechanisms by which economic 
rationalism penetrates everyday life under neoliberalism (Foucault, 2008). We saw how 
socio-economic technologies such as the baseline survey are combined with the personal 
interventions of the animator, in order to change the behaviours of villagers. We saw how 
corporate hierarchical structures are overlaid on traditional social networks in order to 
assemble the biopolitical accounts necessary to manage the population. Our examination 
has shown how accounting technologies embedded in microfinance serve as mechanisms 
for “’informal’ social control, through the cultivation of group pressures on the individual 
to conform to norms of proficiency, organisational and familial goals and values” (Walker, 
2016, p. 47), and, in particular, how such norms can be reconstructed and propagated 
using those accounting technologies. 
 47 
We also saw how the immaterial labour of the poor is captured and monetized for 
the production of both life and profit, through a process that localizes the global features 
of neoliberal economic production. This exploitation of local differences permits each 
instance of microfinance to be tailored to the individual, integrating the poor into the 
global economy. This reinforces the understanding that the poor are an “indispensable 
presence” in the production of wealth (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 157). The adoption of 
economic behaviours and mentalities by the poor cannot be disentangled from their 
expressions of appreciation for the beneficial effects of microfinance; these are mutually 
constituting and make it impossible to argue that microfinance is only exploitative or only 
beneficial. We saw women who enjoy each other’s company, spending time together. We 
saw them working to earn the resources to send their children to university and to build 
homes. However, we also encountered evidence of them working in greater isolation than 
they traditionally did, and moving from one bank loan to another, unable to get out of 
debt and unable to build their businesses beyond the limits of their family labour power. 
Our analysis has demonstrated the centrality of microaccountability in the service 
of neoliberalism. Microaccountability is not just a quaint arrangement necessitated by the 
economic constraints of operating in poor villages in the Global South. The same use of 
social relations is made in wealthier societies, to harness microaccountability to the 
engine of production and to integrate the production of life into the production of wealth. 
The market capitalization of social media corporations makes this obvious. We would 
argue that social media generates enormous wealth for shareholders explicitly because 
it organizes and takes advantage of the microaccountability of the self to others. 
Microfinance generates wealth because it similarly arranges and exploits the 
microaccountability of convivial relationships, and integrates immaterial labour with 
consumption. In the case of microfinance, the consumption that matters most is the 
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consumption of debt, not the consumption of goods and services produced by the village 
women. Microfinance has no more need to make its borrowers wealthy than Facebook 
has to make its users wealthy. It is simply a system to capture microaccountability and 
monetise it. 
Our concept of microaccountability is useful for further research. It can help us 
understand how flexible networks are used to circulate global capital in variety of other 
spaces beyond the formal organization. Accounting researchers will find different milieus 
in which decisions are made through convivial relationships. In these distributed sites, 
they will need to theorise and examine unconventional forms of performance 
measurement, audit, risk management, and accounting. They will need to examine the 
use of biopolitical tools and how, in a society of control, labour is immaterialised and the 
individual continuously subjectivized as an entrepreneur of the self. 
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FIGURE 1: 
Rural women organized for microfinance, and their cashbook 
  
Source: Photographs taken by authors 
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FIGURE 2: 
Microfinance loan collection for a private bank 
  
Source: Photographs taken by authors 
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FIGURE 3: 
Microfinance village as a disciplinary structure 
 
Source: Various conversations and documents from our field research 
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FIGURE 4: 
Extract from the group constitution, page 1 (translation ours) 
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FIGURE 5: 
Examples of development accounts and narratives 
 
Source: Gemidiriya Annual Report 2012, various pages. 
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TABLE 1: 
Comparison of disciplinary and neoliberal governance 
 Disciplinary Neoliberalism 
Organization Enclosed sites for the 
organization of bodies  
Flexible networks for the 
circulation of capital 
Level The individual The population 
Interventions Hierarchical surveillance, 
exercise, confession 
Performance measurement, 
auditing, quasi-markets 
Normalization Discourses on abnormality Statistical norms 
Subjectification Self-discipline Entrepreneur of oneself 
Source: Adapted from Munro (2012, p. 351) 
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TABLE 2: 
Fieldwork summary 
Interviewees Role People Mode Purpose Duration Dates 
Central Bank officers Manage 
microfinance 
(MF) projects 
4 In person 
and Skype 
To discuss how MF 
programs work 
14 hours over 
9 meetings 
February-August 
2013, July 2014, 
December 2014 
Retired Central Bank 
Assistant Governor  
Introduced MF 
to Sri Lanka; 
developed 
institutional 
regulations and 
training 
materials 
1 Skype To discuss aims and 
mechanisms of MF 
2 hours July 2013 
Local academic  Researched 
above initiative 
1 In person To discuss aims and 
mechanisms of MF 
2 hours August 2013 
Bank officers from 
regional 
development bank  
Oversee MF 
services 
4 In person 
and Skype 
To understand details of 
MF activities 
20 hours over 
12 meetings 
July-August 2013, 
July 2014, 
December 2014 
Former and current 
MF animators  
MF field officers; 
one now runs a 
MF training 
institute sub-
contracted to 
Central Bank 
4 In person 
and Skype 
To understand their 
role, activities, and 
influence on MF 
implementation 
7 hours over 5 
meetings  
February-August 
2013, July 2014, 
December 2014 
Women in MF 
activities 
MF borrowers 18 In person; 
follow-up 
by phone 
Focus group meetings, 
plus visits to homes and 
businesses, to 
understand how their 
lives are embedded in 
microfinance 
26 hours over 
15 occasions, 
plus 4 phone 
conversations  
August 2013, July 
2014, December 
2014 
Husbands of above 
women  
Provide labour 
and moral 
support 
7 In person To understand other MF 
roles and effects 
With the 
women 
mentioned 
above 
 
Other family 
members of above 
women, including 
children 
Indirectly 
involved in MF 
10 In person To understand other MF 
effects 
With the 
women 
mentioned 
above 
 
Total   49   71 hours  
Observations  Methods    Dates 
6 society meetings; 
9 home and business visits 
Interviews, conversations, and close observations 
of business activities 
 August 2013, July 
2014, December 
2014 
Supplementary interviews Individual and group interviews, in person  May 2016, March 
2017 
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TABLE 3: 
Biopolitical tools used in Sri Lankan microfinance 
Tool Purpose 
Animator’s 
Involvement Disciplinary Effects Biopolitical Effects 
Baseline 
survey 
sheets 
To gather basic 
data about 
villagers’ poverty 
level so that their 
eligibility for MF 
services can be 
determined 
Goes to village, 
speaks to people, 
investigates lives, 
assesses level of 
poverty 
First evaluative gaze 
of MF, establishes 
animator as expert 
Animator manages 
the entire village by 
the data collected 
Instruction 
manuals 
To guide the 
villagers on how to 
live a “better life” 
(e.g., importance 
of drinking warm 
water) 
Gathers villagers 
into a meeting 
place, explains 
contents of 
manuals   
Villagers begin 
mutual surveillance, 
are led to think 
differently about 
their life style and 
cultural habits   
Manuals provide 
initial criteria for 
measuring 
effectiveness and 
efficiency of lives 
Course 
manuals 
To teach villagers 
about MF services, 
self-management, 
empowerment, 
record-keeping 
and group 
discipline  
Circulates manuals 
to the villagers, 
plans training 
sessions, explains 
what villagers need 
to focus on 
Teaches villagers to 
create and keep 
records of their 
behaviour 
Organizes villagers 
into “self-help” 
groups 
 
Loan 
applications 
and 
approval 
forms 
To engender 
financial hope and 
entrepreneurial 
thinking amongst 
the villagers 
Circulates forms, 
helps villagers fill 
out forms, reports 
progress of 
applications back to 
villagers   
Teaches villagers to 
subject themselves 
to scrutiny and to 
seek approval 
Categorises villagers 
as loan applicants, 
loan receivers and 
trustworthy 
customers 
Receipt 
books for 
debt 
collection 
To record and 
acknowledge the 
collection of a 
payment 
Explains the 
importance of 
keeping book safe, 
publicizes correct 
loan repayment 
behaviours to the 
group 
Connects individual 
financial capability 
to habit of loan 
repayment 
Categorises villagers 
according to their 
capacity to repay   
Assessment 
and 
feedback 
forms 
To evaluate 
financial and 
entrepreneurial 
performance of 
villagers 
Circulates the 
forms, interviews 
individuals, helps 
them fill out forms 
Reinforces 
importance of 
correct financial 
behaviours through 
measurement, 
visibility to group, 
and reporting to MF 
institution 
Compares villagers 
according to their 
performance, 
permits control and 
management of 
populations for 
profit-making 
purposes 
Source: Interviews with villagers, animators and MF officials 
 
